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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KENDRA & TIMOTHY MABEY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20080378-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Timothy and Kendra Mabey's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P. 3d 
699. This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress (R2. 60-54). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Timothy and Kendra Mabey appeal from the judgment and sentences of the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth District Court, after the denial of their motions to 
suppress and Timothy's conviction of possession with intent to manufacture or produce a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony by a Sery guilty plea and Kendra's conviction 
of (Insert conviction) also by a Sery guilty plea. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Timothy Mabey was charged by criminal information filed on April 20, 2007 in 
Fourth District Court with possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug free zone 
with a prior conviction, a third degree felony, possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug 
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, production of marijuana, a controlled substance in a 
drug free zone, a second degree felony, and endangerment of child or elder adult, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37a-5(l), 58-
37-8(l)(a)(i) and 76-5-112.5 respectively (R. 05-06). Kendra Mabey was charged by 
criminal information filed on April 20, 2007 in Fourth District Court with possession or 
use of marijuana, a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, 
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, production 
of marijuana, a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, and 
endangerment of child or elder adult, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(d), 58-37a-5(l), 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) and 76-5-112.5 respectively (R2. 
05-06): 
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At the preliminary hearing held on June 13, 2007, the Court found probable cause 
in the case of Timothy Mabey, with the exception of count 4, endangerment of a child or 
elder adult, and counts 1-3 were bound over for trial (R. 27-25). The court also found 
probable cause in the case of Kendra Mabey on all counts and the charges were bound 
over for trial (R2. 29-28). 
Defense counsel filed a joint motion to suppress on August 15, 2007 (R2. 40-37). 
Counsel argued that Officer Hurst's entry was unlawful and that all evidence found as a 
result was inadmissible (R2. 39-38). Counsel also argued that the evidence seized after 
the officer obtained consent was tainted with illegality (R2. 39-38). In its response, filed 
September 26, 2007, the State argued that both probable cause and exigent circumstances 
existed at the time of Officer's Hurst's entry into the house, making a warrantless search 
of the home lawful (R. 41-39) (R2. 50-44). The State asserted that the marijuana was 
discovered in plain view and lawfully seized (R. 39). In addition, the State argued that 
because consent was given and no prior search tainted the evidence with illegality, that 
all evidence discovered is admissible (R. 39-38). Defense counsel's reply, filed 
November 16, 2007, argued that the search of the home was unlawful because although 
probable cause may have existed, exigent circumstances did not (R. 51-48) (R2. 60-54). 
On December 11, 2007, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the 
Mabeys' joint motion to suppress (R. 64-53) (R2. 71-64). The court held that the first 
search of the home was lawful and that the officer had probable cause and exigent 
circumstances (R. 61-60) (R2. 68-67). The court held that the second warrantless search 
of the home was unconstitutional due to an absence of exigent circumstances (R. 60-59) 
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(R2. 67-66). The third search was held to be constitutional, even though it followed an 
illegal search of the home (R. 59) (R2. 66). The court based this ruling on the fact that 
consent was obtained through knowledge that had been obtained through the first lawful 
search and therefore was untainted by the second unlawful search (R. 59) (R2. 66). 
Evidence obtained as a result of the second search was ruled inadmissible as far as there 
actually was any evidence obtained from that search, but all other evidence would be 
admissible (R. 58) (R2. 65). 
On February 13, 2008, Timothy Mabey waived his right to a jury trial and pled 
guilty to a third degree felony, possession with intent to manufacture or produce a 
controlled substance, for which the State agreed to enter his conviction as one class A 
misdemeanor upon the successful completion of probation (R. 72-69). Also on February 
13, 2008, Kendra Mabey waived her right to a jury trial and pled guilty to a third degree 
felony, possession with intent to manufacture or produce a controlled substance, for 
which the State agreed to enter her conviction as one class A misdemeanor upon the 
successful completion of probation (R2. 85-76). The guilty pleas were Sery pleas that 
allow the Mabeys to appeal the Court's denial of their motion to suppress the evidence 
against them (R. 81-73) (R2. 85-77). 
On March 26, 2008, Timothy Mabey was given a suspended sentence of up to five 
years in prison, ordered to spend 60 days in the Utah County Jail with the GPS program 
authorized, placed on probation for 36 months, and ordered to pay $950 fine, plus 
surcharge and interest (R. 86-83). Kendra Mabey was given a suspended sentence of up 
to five years in prison, ordered to spend 60 days in the Utah County Jail with the GPS 
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program authorized, placed on probation for 36 months, and ordered to pay $950 fine, 
plus surcharge and interest (R2. 92-90). 
On April 24, 2008, Notices of Appeal were filed with the Fourth District Court (R. 
90) (R2. 96). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 15, 2007, Officer Jay Hurst was dispatched to the Mabey home on a 
medical detail (R. 110:4). When he arrived at the location the ambulance crew was 
already there and were loading the patient, Tammy Wilbanks (Kendra Mabey's mother), 
into the ambulance (R. 110:5). Officer Hurst was approached by one of the ambulance 
crew and told that there was marijuana in the home (R. 110:5). Officer Hurst also saw 
marijuana sticking to the ambulance stretcher as they were loading the patient onto the 
ambulance (R. 110:5). 
Officer Hurst then asked the ambulance crewmember to show him where the 
marijuana was at in the residence (R. 110:6). The two entered the home and went into the 
master bedroom (R. 110:6). In the bedroom he saw ashtrays with burnt marijuana joints, 
a marijuana pipe (R. 110:6). The crewmember then explained that while looking for the 
patient's insulin she had entered the master bathroom and found marijuana plants (R. 
110:6). Officer Hurst then entered the bathroom and also saw the marijuana plants on the 
counter (R. 110:6). After that he froze the environment, went through the house to make 
sure there were no other occupants in the residence (R. 110:7). After seeing that no one 
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else was in the home, he went over to a neighbor's residence to obtain the children's 
information (R. 110:8). 
He also contacted Sergeant Smith of the Payson Police Department (R. 110:8). 
After Sergeant Smith arrived at the home, Sergeant Smith requested to be shown the 
items Officer Hurst was describing (R. 110:27). He stated that he "needed to see" and the 
two, along with Officer Shaw, reentered the home (R. 110:16, 27). Officer Hurst showed 
the other two what he had seen earlier and they exited the house (R. 110:16). 
Timothy and Kendra Mabey then arrived at the home and were approached by the 
officers (R. 110:24). They were separated and told that an ambulance had come to take 
Ms. Wilbanks away, that she was fine, and that the ambulance crew had shown the 
officers several items of drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and two marijuana plants (R. 
110:24). He then gave the Mabeys a choice of giving consent to search or waiting for a 
search warrant (R. 110:25). Sergeant Smith told each of them what he had seen in the 
home from plain view and that the items were going to be taken out either way and they 
were going to be arrested (R. 110:25). He then informed them that the only difference 
between their giving consent and obtaining a warrant from the Judge would be time (R. 
110:25). After speaking with each other the Mabeys signed the consent form to search 
their home (R. 110:25). 
While speaking with Sergeant Smith about the search of the home, Kendra Mabey 
admitted that she smokes marijuana "because she needs to cope" (R. 110:26). Ms. Mabey 
also indicated that the large tin the officers say was kind of like a group tin and that all 
three, Timothy, Kendra, and Kendra's mother, Tammy Wilbanks, used everything-in it 
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(R. 110:26-27). She also admitted that the three had smoked marijuana that morning in 
the room (R. 110:27). She informed Sergeant Smith that the plants were not hers and that 
she was taking care of them for her brother who was on juvenile probation (R. 110:27). 
Timothy Mabey also admitted to caring for the plants (R. 110:14). Officer Hurst also 
testified that when he asked Kendra if she had any marijuana on her that she told him she 
had some marijuana in her purse that she had purchased and that it was in the vehicle 
they were driving (R 110:11). 
After obtaining consent, the police again entered the home a third time (R. 
110:26). Sergeant Smith testified that he could smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana in 
the bedroom and that on the bed were two tins, and in plain view of those tins were 
marijuana pipes and ashtrays and marijuana (R. 110:24-25). He also testified that in the 
bathroom were two marijuana plants sitting on the counter (R. 110:25). The officers took 
photographs and removed all of the items from the home (R. 110:26). They also found 
two photographs - one of Kendra Mabey and one of Timothy Mabey - smoking what 
appeared to be marijuana joints (R. 110:30). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the partial denial of Timothy and Kendra Mabey's 
motion to suppress and vacate their condition guilty plea because the evidence against 
them was obtained through unlawful searches and seizure of their personal property. 
The Mabey home was unreasonably searched within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because a warrantless search was performed without"the necessary exigent 
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circumstances needed in addition to probable cause. The home was searched at the 
request of the officer to see the marijuana, not because the officer was concerned about 
the safety of himself or others or that evidence was at risk of being damaged, destroyed, 
or secreted by an unknown individual in the home. 
Furthermore, the search and seizure of evidence by the police was not performed 
with legally valid consent given by the Mabeys. The consent given was tainted by the 
previous illegality of the prior searches and therefore does not meet the requirements of 
the consent exception as required for the police to perform a warrantless search of the 
home with the defendants' consent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Searches of the Mabey Home were Unconstitutional and the Evidence 
Obtained Therefrom Should have been Suppressed. 
The warrant requirements of the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the 
United States of America were created to protect c[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
United States Constitution, Amend IV; Utah Constitution Art.I, § 14. "As the United 
States Supreme Court has stated, c . . . [P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" State v. Duran, 2007 
UT 23, % 6, 156 P.3d 795 (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972)). 
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Therefore, searches performed "outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). There are only two of these exceptions that 
are relevant to the case at hand: exigent circumstances and the consent exception. 
A. There were not exigent circumstances allowing the officers) to search the 
Mabeys' home without a warrant. 
The exigent circumstances exception applies "where probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are proven." State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219 [^ 24, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997)). Although Officer Hurst did have 
probable cause to search the home, there were not exigent circumstances and the initial 
search of the home was unconstitutional. 
The U.S. Supreme Court as has defined exigent circumstances, "specially 
pressing or urgent law enforcement need[s]." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 
121 S.Ct 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 
(1983)). This Court in State v. Beavers further defined exigent circumstances as existing 
where the delay in obtaining a warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the officers or other 
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, or the escape of the suspect/" 859 P.2d 9, 
26 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
An example of exigent circumstances is "the need to protect or preserve life or 
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avoid serious injury." Mincey v. Arizona, 431 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 
290 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 241 (1963)). Under 
the emergency aid doctrine, as this example of exigent circumstances is often termed, 
warrantless search is lawful if the following requirements are met:"(l) Police have an 
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and believe there is an 
immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life; (2) The search is not 
primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence; (3) There is some reasonable 
basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched; That is, there must 
be a connection with the area to be searched and the emergency." State v. Comer, 2002 
UTApp2191f5, 51P.3d55. 
Unlike the Comer case in which the court ruled the warrantless entry lawful 
because officers entered the home after receiving a call about domestic violence and 
observing the unusual behavior of the wife when she spoke with the police outside the 
home and suddenly and unexpectedly went back into the home, this is not a case in which 
the officer had a "reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be 
searched." 
In the Comer case officers had reason to fear for the wife's safety based on the fact 
that they had been called about a domestic disturbance and she had informed them her 
husband was inside the home before unexpectedly and in the middle of a conversation 
leaving and reentering the home. In the present case, however, there was no need to 
protect life or avoid serious injury or to believe that there was. Officer Hurst entered the 
home-for the primary purpose of seizing evidence, axlear violation of the second 
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requirement of the emergency aid doctrine. Wilbanks had already received proper 
treatment and was outside the home when he arrived at the scene. Officer Hurst testified 
that Wilbanks did not require his assistance in her medical treatment at the time of his 
arrival (R. 110:22). In fact, the police report indicates that the officers were not 
dispatched to the Mabey residence until after the patient had been attended to and the 
ambulance crew discovered the marijuana. The officer's entry could not be based on a 
need to protect life or avoid serious injury, therefore, no exigent circumstances exist 
under the emergency aid doctrine. 
Another example of exigent circumstances is the prevention of the destruction of 
evidence, but only when offices have a reasonable belief that such destruction is certain 
to occur. Duran, 2007 UT 23 at 1f8. 
In State v. Duran the Utah Supreme Court examined exigent circumstances in 
terms of the destruction of evidence aspect. After a report from family members that 
marijuana was being smoked at another family member's residence the police responded 
to the home. Duran, 2007 UT 23 at \ 2. When the officers arrived they were told by a 
person present at the scene that people in the home were smoking marijuana and also 
warned that there were weapons in the home that the homeowner had threatened to use 
against the police. Id. Upon approaching the home, the officers also smelled the odor of 
marijuana being smoked and concluded that the evidence was in the process of being 
destroyed/consumed and entered the home. Id. at f3. The Court held that these 
circumstances did not amount to exigent circumstances and that the warrantless search of 
the home was unlawful. Id. at [^8, The Court ruled that "there is an exclusive, limited 
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roster of exceptions to the requirement that a warrant be secured before a lawful search 
can occur" and they declined to add to that the circumstances of this case. Id. at \A. The 
court further ruled that exigent circumstances for purposes of warrantless entry do not 
include "the mere possibility that evidence may be destroyed." Id. at [^8 (quoting State v. 
South, 885 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'don other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 
(Utah 1996)). 
There is no evidence that before his initial search Officer Hurst saw anyone or had 
reason to believe that there was anyone in the home that could destroy or secrete 
evidence, much less a belief that would amount to the standard as outlined in Duran. 
From his testimony at the preliminary hearing it appears as though someone told him 
prior to his search of the home that Wilbanks was tending the children who were at home 
and that the defendants were not at home. In fact, Officer Hurst testified that he saw the 
children outside on the front lawn and was informed that another child was at a 
neighbor's house to the south (R. 110:15). He also made no effort to speak with the 
patient, Tammy Wilbanks, to ask if other people could be inside the home before he 
searched the home (R. 110:21). In the case of Duran the officers knew that there were 
people in the home but this still did not provide a basis for a warrantless search. There is 
nothing from Officer Hurst's testimony to suggest that he had even considered the 
destruction of evidence as even a "mere possibility," much less that such a suspicion 
would amount to a reasonable belief of the nature to justify a warrantless entry. 
Officer Hurst's primary motivation for entering the house was to view the 
marijuana discovered by emergency personnel He testified that he "asked the crew 
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member to show [him] where the marijuana was at in the residence." (R. 110:6). He made 
no indication that he was concerned about the destruction of evidence and only after 
being shown the marijuana by the crewmember did he perform a cursory search of the 
home for other people. No evidence was presented to the Court to support any inference 
that Officer Hurst reasonably believed that any other person could have been inside the 
home before his initial search, much less that such person could damage, destroy or 
secrete evidence. Therefore, there could not have been exigent circumstances based on a 
reasonable belief that the destruction of evidence was certain to occur. 
B. The search of the home after consent was given was tainted by the previous 
illegality of prior searches. 
In making the determination of whether or not the consent exception applies, the court 
applies a two-part test outlined by the Court of Appeals in State v. Sepulveda. To qualify 
for the exception, both of the following requirements must be satisfied: "(1) the consent 
must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation 
of the prior illegality." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992) (citation 
omitted). The second part of the test applies "when 'antecedent police illegality exists/" 
Id (citation omitted). 
Whether consent is voluntary "is a fact sensitive issue to be determined by 
examining the totality of the circumstances,' including 'the specific characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the police conduct.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
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The search of the Mabeys' home does not meet the requirements of the consent 
exception. First the consent was not voluntarily given. Sergeant Smith testified that he 
told both defendants that the only difference between consent and a warrant was time. (R 
110:25). The Mabeys were faced with a situation in which they believed their only option 
was to allow their home to be searched. 
Even if consent was voluntarily given, the subsequent consent does not cure the 
original illegality of the prior searches. The first search is unconstitutional based on a 
lack of exigent circumstances justifying Officer Hurst's initial entry into the house. There 
is no evidence before the court that would suggest he had a reasonable belief that 
evidence could be destroyed or that his presence in the home was needed to protect life or 
avoid serious injury. 
However, even if the first search was constitutional the second search was 
unconstitutional, as the lower court has found. There was no justification for Officer 
Hurst reentering the home accompanied by Sergeant Smith and Officer Shaw. The home 
had been secured and the officers knew with certainty that there was no danger of 
evidence being destroyed. The second search of the home directly played into the 
Mabeys' giving consent to the search of the home and is therefore an element to be 
considered in the context of their consent. Sergeant Smith exploited knowledge gained by 
the prior illegality of the second search to obtain both Timothy and Kendra Mabey's 
consent. He told both defendants the items he had seen inside the home and that 
"obviously they were illegal [and] [t]hat we needed to take them out of the home." (R. 
110:25). Sergeant Smith was only present at the second seaifch of the home and without. 
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the knowledge he gained as a product of this search would not have been able to inform 
the Mabeys of the items found in their home. Without this information the decision the 
Mabeys made at that time could have been different and in any case this illegality would 
nullify the validity of their consent. There is no way for the Court to separate the 
knowledge and subsequent actions of Sergeant Smith gained as a result of the second 
illegal search and his use of that knowledge in obtaining the defendants' consent from the 
first search of the home by Officer Hurst, if it were to find the first search lawful. 
Therefore, the consent given by the Mabeys was not valid as it was tainted by the 
illegality of the prior searches of their home. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Kendra and Timothy Mabey respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress and vacate the 
conditional Sery pleas, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11TH day of March, 2009. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 1 ^ ^ . 
Counsel for Appellant ^ r ^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OTSSBT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






RULING ON DEFENDANTS' JOINT 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 071401686 
CASE NO. 071401687 
DATE: December 11,2007 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
On August 15, 2007, counsel for Defendants, Anthony Howell, filed Defendants' Joint 
Motion and Memorandum to Suppress. On September 26, 2007, Donna Kelly, Utah County 
Attorney, filed the State's Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Suppress. On November 16, 2007, Anthony Howell filed Defendants' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Suppress. The parties submitted the matter on the pleadings. 




The Court notes that there is an absence of facts which might have bearing on the 
decision of the Court. A preliminary hearing was conducted in this case on June 13, 2007 and 
both parties have cited to the record. However, neither party has requested an evidentiary 
hearing and neither has requested oral argument in this case. With that background, the Court 
determines the following facts: 
1. On April 15, 2007, Officer Jay Hurst responded to a medical detail at the Defendants' 
home. 
2. When Officer Hurst arrived at the home, Defendant Kendra Mabey's mother, Tammy 
Willbanks, was there. She had experienced a seizure. EMTs were attending to her and 
lifting her into an ambulance. 
3. As the EMTs were lifting Ms. Willbanks into the ambulance, Officer Hurst observed 
marijuana on the stretcher. 
4. Before the seizure, Ms. Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' children. 
5. An EMT told Officer Hurst that there was marijuana in the home. 
6. Officer Hurst asked the reporting EMT to show him the marijuana. The EMT took 
Officer Hurst to the master bedroom. 
7. Officer Hurst saw burnt marijuana joints and a marijuana pipe in the master bedroom. 
8. In addition, he saw marijuana plants on the counter in the master bathroom. 
9. Officer Hurst then "froze" the environment. He went through the home making sure 
there were no occupants inside. 
10. Officer Hurst called Sergeant Lance Smith. 
11. When Sergeant Smith arrived, Officer Hurst took him inside the home and showed him 
what was in plain view. This second plain view search lasted approximately five 
minutes. 
12. After the plain view search, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith went back outside and 
waited for the Defendants to arrive. 
13. When the Defendants arrived, the officers explained that they were called to the home 
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because Ms. Willbanks had had a seizure. They also explained that upon their arrival at 
the home, an EMT told them there was marijuana in the home. Finally, they explained 
that they had gone inside the home and seen marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view. 
The officers Mirandized the Defendants. Both Defendants then signed a consent form 
allowing the search of their home. 
14. During the subsequent search, Officer Hurst discovered a photograph of Mr. Mabey 
smoking a marijuana joint and a photograph of Ms. Mabey smoking a marijuana joint. 
II. 
Legal Analysis 
In this case, officers searched the Defendants' home, without a warrant, three times. 
Officer Hurst performed a plain view search in connection with his sweep of the home after 
observing marijuana on the ambulance stretcher and being informed by the EMT that there was 
marijuana in the home. When Sergeant Smith arrived at the scene, he and Officer Hurst 
performed a second plain view search. Finally, after the Defendants arrived at the scene and 
signed a consent form allowing the search of their home, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith 
performed a more thorough search. 
Searches performed '"outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions relevant 
in this case are the exigent circumstances exception and the consent exception. 
The exigent circumstances exception applies "where probable cause and exigent 
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circumstances are proven." State v. Comer, 51 P.3d 55, 64 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. 
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Probable cause exists where the facts and 
circumstances known to the officers are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Id. at 63 (quoting State v. Dorsey, 731 
P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)). Exigent circumstances exist where the delay in obtaining a 
warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant 
evidence, or the escape of the suspect.'" State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citation omitted). 
To determine whether the consent exception applies, courts apply a two-part test: '"(1) 
the consent must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality.'" State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(citation omitted). The second part of the test only applies "when 'antecedent police 
illegality exists.'" Id. (citation omitted). Whether consent is voluntary '"is a fact sensitive issue 
to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances,' including 'the specific 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
Factors that indicate a lack of coercion in obtaining consent include "the officer's lack 'of a claim 
of authority to search,' 'the absence of an exhibition of force' by the officer, 'the officer's mere 
request to search,'" the defendant's '"cooperation"' and "the officer's lack of 'deception.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
A. 
Search No. 1 
The first plain view search performed by Officer Hurst was supported by probable cause 
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and exigent circumstances. Officer Hurst saw marijuana on the ambulance stretcher. In addition, 
the EMT told him that there was marijuana in the home. These facts and circumstances were 
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been 
committed. Therefore, the search was supported by probable cause. Officer Hurst also knew 
Ms. Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' children. Nothing in the record suggests that 
Officer Hurst knew how many children the Defendants' had or whether they had all been 
removed from the home. The delay in obtaining a warrant would have risked potential physical 
harm to the children from the exposure to drugs if there were indeed children in the home. 
Moreover, if the officers had locked down the home with children still inside, the children could 
have suffered emotional trauma. In addition, the search of the home was authorized to remove 
anyone who might damage, destroy, or secrete the evidence. The Court notes that the subject 
evidence could have been easily destroyed, damaged, or secreted by anyone in the home. 
Therefore, the search was supported by exigent circumstances. Because the first plain view 
search performed by Officer Hurst was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, it 
was constitutionally permissible despite the absence of a warrant. 
B. 
Search No. 2 
Although the second plain view search performed by Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith 
was supported by probable cause, it was not supported by exigent circumstances. During the first 
plain view search, Officer Hurst saw burnt marijuana joints and a marijuana pipe in the master 
bedroom. In addition, he saw marijuana plants on the counter in the master bathroom. These 
facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that 
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an offense had been committed. Therefore, the search was supported by probable cause. 
However, because, prior to the second plain view search, Officer Hurst had already swept the 
home and assured that there was no one inside, the delay in obtaining a search warrant would not 
have risked physical harm to anyone. Nor would it have risked the destruction of relevant 
evidence or the escape of the suspects, as the scene had already been secured. Therefore, the 
second plain view search was not supported by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the search 
was unconstitutional. 
C. 
Search No. 3 
The third search was supported by consent. When the Defendants arrived at the scene the 
officers explained the situation and Mirandized them. The Defendants then signed a consent 
form allowing the search of their home. Nothing in the record indicates that the consent was 
involuntary on the part of either Defendant or that the officers deceived the Defendants. The 
officers explained that they were called to the home because Ms. Willbanks had had a seizure. 
They further explained that upon their arrival at the home, an EMT told them there was 
marijuana in the home. Finally, they explained that they had gone inside the home and seen 
marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view. After being advised of these facts and circumstances, 
both Defendants signed a consent form allowing the search of their home. Although the consent 
was obtained after the officers performed an illegal search of the home (the second search), it 
was supported by an explanation of facts known to Officer Hurst as a result of his initial, legal 
search of the home. In other words, the Defendants' consent was not obtained by police 




Defendants' Joint Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. The initial 
plain view search of the Defendants' home was supported by probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. The third search was supported by consent. Therefore, to the extent Defendants' 
Motion relates to evidence discovered as a direct result of those searches, their Motion is denied. 
However, the second plain view search was not supported by exigent circumstances or any other 
exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the second plain view search was 
unconstitutional. Therefore, to the extent the Defendants' Motion relates to evidence discovered 
as a direct result of that search, their Motion is granted. Because these Motions were submitted 
on the memoranda without an evidentiary hearing and without oral argument, it is unclear what 
evidence, if any, was discovered during the second search. 
By the Court, 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
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